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Securitization of Small Business Loans
Christopher P. Beshouri
Peter J. Nigro

This paper assesses the potential impact of securitization in improving small
businesses’ access to credit. It begins by examining the nature of small business
lending and the factors that make banks the primary providers of credit to small
businesses. The paper then examines the conditions under which the benefits
of securitization are fully realized and whether the nature of small business lend
ing satisfies those conditions. We a r ^ e that certain characteristics of small firm
finance, especially information problems and the need for ongoing monitoring,
are likely to mitigate the full benefits of securitization, that is, the substantial
funding cost advantages. Specifically, loan buyers will demand substantial levels
of loss protection to compensate for their uncertainty over the returns on the
underlying credits and to leave intact the seller’s incentive to monitor properly
the loans sold. Loss protection, however, will reduce or eliminate any funding
cost advantages, including capital cost reductions. In the absence of lower fund
ing costs, banks are unlikely to undertake substantial new lending to small busi
nesses. Securitizations of small business loans could still take place, but they are
likely to be undertaken for special purposes rather than as a primary funding
mechanism.

I.

Introduction

The critical role of small firms in the U.S. economy, particularly as the pri
mary creators of jobs, is often used as justification for government interven
tion in the small business sector. T his intervention has appeared in
numerous forms: tax incentives, streamlined regulatory and supervisory
procedures, and loan guarantees. Recent research has examined the role of
small firms in the U.S. economy in an effort to bring about more effective
government intervention and to clarify the basis for those interventions. For
example, while SBA reports show that small firms, especially those with
fewer than 20 employees, were responsible for all net job growth between
1988 and 1990, other studies, such as Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1994)
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have shown that there is no clear relationship between net job growth and
employer size over longer periods of time. Their study also argues that
many of the new jobs created by small firms are in the service sector, where
job quality and wages tend to be lower. Such studies do not invalidate the
policy focus on small firms, but they do indicate that a clearer and more
sophisticated understanding of small business economics is needed to make
informed policy choices.
Small firms’ access to credit has been central to the public policy debate.
Recently, policymakers have been considering measures to increase the flow
of credit to small firms, in particular the development of a secondary mar
ket for small business loans. Most legislative initiatives insinuate that small
business loan securitization will enhance the marketability of small business
loans, permitting banks to make more small business loans and quickly sell
them off to other investors. Using mortgage loans as a guide, they a i ^ e
that the development of a secondary market would perm it specialization in
origination, servicing, and funding of small business loans by the most effi
cient financial intermediary. Furthermore, the act of pooling and offering
loans for sale in a secondary market would help take small business funding
from the narrower bank market to the broader and deeper capital markets.
The combination of nonbank participants in credit delivery and the use of
securitization of loans to tap the capital markets would, the reasoning goes,
lead to more credit or cheaper credit or both for small businesses.
However, we argue that the nature and magnitude of the benefits of
securitization will vary according to the type of asset being securitized.
Securitization is likely to deliver substantial benefits when the underlying
credits are relatively easy to assess and require little post-funding monitor
ing. When information and monitoring problems are substantial, however,
the benefits of securitization are likely to be minimal. In assessing securiti
zation as a solution to the credit problems facing small firms, it is important
to understand the specific nature and attributes of small business lending.^
In particular, there are two prominent characteristics associated with small
firms: the shortage of reliable information about their risks and returns
and the importance of ongoing monitoring in delivering expected loan
returns. These obstacles have not been present or have been small in mag
nitude for assets that have been successfully securitized.
Because of the shortage of reliable information and the need for ongo
ing monitoring, purchasers of small business loans will demand that the
seller provide relatively high levels of loss protection. Investors will seek
high levels of loss protection to compensate for their inability to estimate
with confidence the risks and returns of the underlying assets and to keep
intact the seller’s incentive to monitor properly the loans sold. The eco-
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nomic effect of providing loss protection is that the selling bank essentially
is unable to shed fully the risk of the loans it has sold, thereby mitigating
some of the benefits of the loan sale. As the level of loss protection provided
by the seller rises, the benefits to the seller from the loan sale fall. The need
for the provision of loss protection also limits the entry of nonbank origina
tors into the small business lending market.
This does not mean that securitizations of unguaranteed small business
loans will not take place. They already have taken place, and will continue
to take place. But we argue that they will be few in number, will involve the
top-end of the small business loan market, and will carry substantial levels
of loss protection. The few small business loan securitizations to date have
in fact carried substantial levels of loss protection.
These conclusions about the limited benefits of securitization in this
area assume that in general banks have m ade and are holding as many
small business loans as they desire; that is, banks do not face a funding con
straint. However, if funding is a problem, and if securitization can lower
funding costs, then securitization—even when the selling bank provides
substantial loss protection—^becomes more beneficial. Specifically, there
may be banks that want to make and hold additional loans but foi^o these
(profitable) lending opportunities because they find deposit generation too
expensive. Such banks would presumably be willing to hold the first-loss
position on loans they sell, if by so doing they can generate affordable fund
ing through the capital markets for unexploited small business lending
opportunities. U nder these circumstances—where funding is a problem
and banks would be willing to take on additional risk-securitization holds
out more promise. Note however, the nature of such transactions: the sell
ing bank retains a substantial portion of the underlying credit risk on the
loans it sells, and the transaction does not generate capital cost savings. The
fimding benefits are relative to deposit generation. Unless funding prob
lems are widespread, the retention of credit risk—and the associated dimi
nution of capital cost savings—will prevent securitization fi-om having the
impact in small business lending that it has had elsewhere.
Public and private initiatives to promote a secondary market for small
business loans specifically, and a higher level of lending to small firms gen
erally, m ust take these characteristics of small business lending into
account, both in the design of the initiatives and in the assessment of the
potential impact of those initiatives. O f course, if a securitization program
is preceded by or developed simultaneously with some type of federal or
state loan guarantee or credit enhancement program, then the amount of
credit available to sm aller firms would likely increase. It is critical to
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emphasize, however, that the increase in small business lending would fol
low largely from the guarantee, not the presence of a secondary market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the
nature of small business finance and small businesses’ primary sources of
credit and other financial services. Section III summarizes the relationship
between sources of funding and the severity of information and monitoring
problems by analyzing a firm’s ability to tap different types of debt markets.
Section IV analyzes the types and potential benefits of securitization. Sec
tion V provides support for our hypothesis by examining the characteristics
and benefits of small business securitizations that have been completed.
Section VI provides conclusions.
II.

THE NATURE OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING

Information problems and the need for ongoing monitoring by the lender/
investor are at the root of the credit availability problems of small firms.
The lack of information and the heterogeneity of small firms makes their
success difficult to predict. Small business borrowers are also likely to
require direct, intensive monitoring by their lenders because of scarcity of
collateral, absence of reputation, and the nature of the credit purpose. This
section evaluates the characteristics of small firm finance and the impact
that information problems and monitoring can have on a firm’s access to
credit.
A.

Information Problems and Small Business Borrowers

The most common explanation given for small firms’ credit availability
problems is the scarcity of information available to investors about project
quality, financial soundness, or probable losses. Many small firms also lack
marketable collateral or have marginal net worth. Start-up firms experi
ence the most trouble, since they often have little beyond a business plan to
show to a prospective lender, and many creditors typically require three
years of financial statements from credit applicants. General information
about small firms, or the industry in which the firm operates may help, but
aggregated data is not a dependable indicator of the credit quality of other
small business borrowers, because the prospects of small firms can vary dra
matically, even within the same business line. The heterogeneity^ of these
borrowers also makes it difficult to develop uniform underwriting stan
dards. Lacking uniform underwriting standards, lenders are limited in
their ability to use less expensive, automated credit-scoring methods for
loan processing.
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The alternative for lenders is to expend additional resources to discover
the true creditworthiness of a small business borrower. For example, loan
officers at South Shore Bank in Chicago, an institution specializing in loans
to information-problematic borrowers like small businesses, routinely drive
through their neighborhoods, exam ining neighboring properties and
developing links to community and business groups. These efforts provide
additional market-specific and borrower-specific information that might
not be available through the standard loan application process. Lenders
can also provide complementary services that might raise the likelihood
that the lender is repaid, such as technical assistance programs, basic busi
ness guidance, or financial counseling. But while these services may
enhance the lender’s ability to evaluate creditworthiness or increase the
probability of repayment, they raise the lender’s costs and thus make the
loan less profitable.
O perating expenses would be an im portant issue for lenders even if
small business borrowers were not information-problematic. Smaller loans
provide a smaller base over which to spread the fixed costs of lending,
regardless of infonnation availability. One estimate puts a typical bank’s
per-loan-dollar operating expenses for small business loans at 300 basis
points, roughly four times the per-loan-dollar expense of middle-market
loans and about 15 times higher than the per-loan-dollar expense of loans
in the large, corporate market.^
B.

Agency Problems and the N eed for Monitoring

Small business lending costs are also higher because lenders typically
must direcdy m onitor borrowers on an ongoing basis. The need for moni
toring arises out of the familiar agency problem or problem of moral hazard in
lending: Once borrowers secure fimds, they may take actions that do not
maximize the probability of loan repayment. Consequently, lenders moni
tor borrowers direcdy or indirecdy in an effort to control the agency prob
lem, that is, to influence the borrower’s attitude toward risk. Monitoring,
which is distinct from servicing, involves paying close attention to firm-spe
cific attributes such as investment policy, use of other credit, management
changes, personnel changes, strategic plans, and project choices (see, e.g.,
Mester, 1992). The borrower’s behavior in these areas can affect the vari
ability of the firm ’s cash flow, which is the primary source of loan repay
m ent. M onitoring is undertaken to restore or m aintain compatibility
between the actions of the borrower and the interests of the lender, and
thereby minimize cash flow variability.
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Lenders could, of course, choose to ignore the agency problem and not
m onitor But if there is a relationship between monitoring and borrower
behavior, and a subsequent relationship between borrower behavior and
firm profitability, then there is a clear relationship between monitoring and
loan returns. Therefore, neglecting monitoring when it is required implies
that the volatility of loan returns will rise while the level of returns falls (see,
e.g., Pennachi, 1988).
Generally, lenders will prefer indirect mechanisms to monitor borrower
behavior, since such mechanisms typically entail lower costs than direct,
ongoing monitoring. A common indirect m onitoring mechanism is the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Maintaining an LTV ratio less than one is meant
to put a sufficient level of borrower wealth at risk such that the borrower’s
incentives approximate those of the lender. One other indirect monitoring
mechanism worth noting is reputation, which can ease the need for direct
monitoring by acting as a form of collateral. Rrms with reputation have less
incentive to take excessive risks because their behavior toward a single
lender can impact their relationship with other creditors and suppliers.
The cost of directly monitoring firms will also fall if the firm has multiple
creditors or if the firm’s debt or equity trades publicly. In these cases, a
number of different agents, such as rating agencies and stock analysts, typ
ically cross-monitor the firm, which lowers the monitoring costs absorbed
by any single agent (see Booth, 1992).
Covenants are an effort to mitigate the agency problem “contractually”
by bonding the borrowers to observable and verifiable performance and
operating criteria. A common covenant is a maximum debt-service-toincome ratio, which is meant to keep the firm’s accumulation of additional
debt at a level the lender considers manageable. O ther common covenants
may bond borrower behavior toward the maintenance and liquidation of
assets-in-place. It is important to note, however, that covenants are not via
ble in cases such as general purpose or working capital loans. Because of
the indeterm inate nature of the credit need, the lender would be left to
bond borrower behavior toward investment policy, strategic plans, project
choice, or managerial compensation (see Booth, 1992). Behavior in these
areas has a distinct impact on the likelihood of repayment, but the bor
rower’s actions are not clearly observable and verifiable ex ante, or even
contemporaneously. Such actions m ight be inferred from ex post out
comes, if there is sufficient information regarding expected returns to a
borrower or a borrower’s line of business. However, the creditor cannot
influence the firm’s decisions after the fact. Consequently, covenants are
limited in their usefulness, and probably least effective when tJie loan pro
ceeds are for an indeterminate purpose.
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Although agency problems and the associated need for monitoring are
common concerns in finance, they are especially prominent in small firm
finance. Small firms, especially start-ups, lack many of the characteristics
that naturally help alleviate the agency problem in business lending. Their
net worth is thin, limiting the loss protection that their own equity can pro
vide and thus the amount of credit they can secure. If small firms have col
lateral, often it is not easily marketable or firm-specific. Consequently,
repayment of loans to small firms rests primarily on expected future cash
flow, which is directiy influenced by the borrower’s actions.
Furthermore, small firms also rely more heavily on general purpose
credit, such as lines Of credit, than on borrowings for assets-in-place, both
in terms of volume and num ber of transactions (see Table 1).^ Because gen
eral purpose credit cannot be tied directly to a set of assets, monitoring
these types of loans is not easily achieved through covenants or other con
tractual features. Equally important, small firms also often lack reputation,
which indicates that there is lim ited public inform ation available about
them. The lack of information suggests that there will be a shortage of third
party monitors, and the full monitoring costs will fall on a single agent.
This often leads to the establishment of a relationship with a specific lender,
which can substitute for reputation. However, such a relationship is built
over time and is not easily transferable.
Taken together, the characteristics of small firm borrowers and the pur
poses for which they need credit limit the usefulness of indirect monitoring
mechanisms. Consequently, lenders must resort to more expensive direct
monitoring of small business borrowers. Because this form of monitoring
is more costly, the profitability and thus attractiveness of small business
lending falls.
C.

The Role o f Banks in Small Firm Finance

The inform ation co^ts associated with borrower screening have long
been viewed as a rationale for the existence of financial intermediaries.
Because the price mechanism does not provide a perfect screening device,
lenders will instead base credit decisions on imperfect, nonprice mecha
nisms, such as referrals, relationships, or exacting underwriting standards.^
Although these screening mechanisms can be effective, they are also costly.
Diamond (1984) argued that financial intermediaries arise as a conse
quence of these screening costs. To avoid duplication of effort, and to lower
their individual costs, investors will form coalitions or designate a single
agent to perform the screening fijnction for them. A coalition or interme
diary can achieve economies of scale in information production and pro-
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Table 1
Most Recent Loan Obtained by Finn, 1987-1988
Percent

Mean in Thousands

Median in Thousands

Line of Credit

30

$679

$100

Mortage

14

$335

$120

Motor ^fehicle

28

$ 33

$ 12

Equipment

15

$ 63

$ 26

Other

11

$282

$ 35

Loan Type

Source:

Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1988.

cessing that investors cannot obtain individually (see also Ramakrishnan &
Thakor, 1984). These coalitions also deliver diversification benefits to
investors.
This literature, however, does not provide for an explicit relationship
between the bank’s advantage in information production and the inherent
nature of the bank itself. The bank’s advantage instead arises largely out of
its choice to specialize in information production. This assumption impUes
that any nonbank entity could make the same choice and become compet
itive with banks in the bank loan market. Furthermore, the early literature
viewed information production as taking place at loan origination, resum
ing only in the event of borrower default, suggesting no significant relation
ship between monitoring and loan returns.
More recent literature on the theory of the banking firm argues that
financial intermediaries form not just because they can achieve economies
of scale in information production and processing, as suggested above, but
because they have a competitive advantage in borrower monitoring that
arises from their provision of transactions services (Nakamura, 1991,
1993). Like screening, monitoring involves fixed costs, and investors find
it economical to delegate monitoring to a central agent. However, banks
have an advantage over nonbanks in generating inform ation to monitor
loans because of their exclusive access to the cash flow inform ation con
tained in transactions accounts kept with the bank. Such cash flow infor
mation is valuable because changes in cash flow can signal changes in
borrower quality.
This information base cannot be duplicated by a nonbank competitor
unless that competitor provides unrestricted transactions accounts to bor
rowers (i.e., it mimics a bank). Alternatively, borrowers seeking nonbank
credit could attem pt to communicate the same cash flow inform ation
tononbank investors, and thereby erode the bank’s exclusive advantage.
Nonbank investors, however, would have no ability to verify the information
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borrowers provide, and banks would have no incentive to confirm or deny
the information for the benefit of these nonbank investors. To do so would
erode the banks’ own competitive position. Nakamura also points out that
this exclusivity is more likely for small or medium-sized firms that operate
in a limited geographical vicinity; smaller firms are more likely than larger
firms to channel all of their financial activity through a single bank or
branch.^
O ther studies extend this line of reasoning by arguing that a bank’s
unique ability to m onitor arises over time as the borrow er and lender
develop an intimate and continuing business relationship. This relation
ship allows the firm to communicate key aspects of its operation to banks,
aspects that may be observable by the capital and money markets, but are
difficult to verify Rajan (1992), for example, refers to an information set
that includes not only cash flow patterns, but also information on project
targets, strategic planning, and quality of personnel. Such information
becomes verifiable by outsiders only ex post, beyond the point where any
actions could be taken to influence the firm’s decisions.
Carey, Prouse, Rey, and Udell (1993) emphasize the agency and moni
toring problems in explaining the existence of financial intermediaries in
what they call the “covenant-monitoring-renegotiation” (CMR) paradigm.
In this formulation, banks establish specific covenants in their financial
contracts with borrowers that are intended to control borrower behavior.
Banks then produce information on an ongoing basis to monitor adherence
to covenants. Breaches in covenants lead to foreclosures or renegotiations.
The CMR paradigm underscores the value of relationship and renegotia
tion in a bank-debt contract relative to a nonbank debt contract.
Lumner and McConnell (1989) test the implications of monitoring- and
relationship-based theories of financial intermediaries by examining the
information content in bank loan decisions. They show that although such
decisions have a positive impact on the stock returns of borrowing firms,
this impact is only significant for renewals of credit arrangements. New loans—
loans to applicants halving no history with the lender to which they are
a p p ly in g -^ o not produce significant excess returns to the firm ’s stock.
This finding suggests a time-dependency in the bank’s comparative advan
tage in producing information for monitoring.
Table 2 provides some evidence on the reliance of small firms on banks
for credit and for other financial services, such as transaction accounts. Fur
thermore, the clustering of services at banks by small-businesses enhances
the bank’s access to information unavailable to other financial institutions,
and allows them to m onitor closely users of funds on an ongoing basis.
Overall, the inform ation and m onitoring advantage of banks enhances
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Table 2
Einancial Services Provided to Small- and
Medium-Sized Firms by Banks and Nonbanks
Commercial
Bank (%)

Financial Service

Nonbank (%)

Checking

95

8

Savings

82

27

Credit

81

42

Leasing

31

76

Line of Credit

92

11

Mortgage

79

24

Motor Vehicle Loan

61

46

Equipment Loan

75

31

Other Loan

80

24

94

14

Transactions

96

8

Cash Management

93

7

Credit Related

89

14

Brokerage

12

88

Trust

96

8

Other

Source:

Gary Elliehausen and John D. Wolken (1990).

their ability relative to nonbanks to evaluate, price, and control risk of
information-problematic and monitoring-intensive borrowers.
III.

DEBT MARKET MIGRATION

Banks are the primary source of funds for small firms, as the foregoing
argues, because banks can most efficiendy solve the information and mon
itoring problems these borrowers present. By extension, the severity of
inform ation problems and the am ount of direct m onitoring required
should help determine any firm ’s funding options and terms. Size also
plays a prominent role. Scheme 1 summarizes the relationship between the
source of funding and the severity of information problems and degree of
monitoring required. In an arrangem ent adapted fi-om Carey et al. (1993),
firms are arrayed across two spectrums: “information problematic” and
“direct monitoring required.” Moving from left to right, information prob
lems (regarding the creditworthiness of borrowers) become less and less
severe. Similarly, the degree of direct monitoring required decreases fix>m
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left to right. In other words, the latitude to use indirect monitoring mech
anisms increases.®
Size may influence debt market migration independent of information
and monitoring problems. For example, a single residential mortgage may
be an excellent credit, but too small for the appetite of the capital markets.
Similarly, a high-grade small firm with stellar reputation offering an assetbased debt instrum ent may not attract capital market attention simply
because of size. Size can be an inhibiting factor because of due diligence
costs. Due diligence costs have a significant fixed component, so investors
have the incentive to spread these costs over larger investments.
Table 3 shows for manufacturing firms how sources of credit can vary by
firm size. Of the smallest manufacturing firms, 41 percent draw their fimding from banks, compared to 17 percent for the largest manufacturing
firms. However, the data also reveal that reliance on bank loans neither
increases nor decreases rnonotonically across size classes, consistent with
expectations (see Rgure 1). Reliance on bank loans increases from 41 per
cent to 50 percent as the asset size of the firm rises from less than $5 million
to between $25 million and $50 million, and then decreases to as low as 17
percent for the largest firms. Use of total nonbank debt displays a mirror
image pattern: reliance on nonbank debt decreases from 28 percent for the
smallest firms to near 20 percent for the next few size classes, and then
steadily increases until it reaches 65 percent for the firms with more than $1
billion in assets. The retention rate follows a fairly steady corresponding
downward path across all of these asset size classes, falling from 80 percent
for the smallest firms to 29 percent for the largest.
The manufacturing firm data are consistent with life-cycle patterns of
financing. Small firms initially rely on insider debt (such as borrowings
from relatives), assets in their private portfolio, accrued expenses, trade
credit, or retained earnings for ongoing finance (see, e.g., Fazzari, Hub
bard, & Petersen, 1987; Walker, 1989). Over time, firms may migrate out
p f costly nonbank debt and into bank loans as they grow larger and develop
a track record (see Walker, 1989). At the m ost m ature stage of the
cycle,where they have developed reputations as credible bank borrowers,
firms may gain greater access to cheaper, more exclusive sources of capital.
The assumption is that borrowers desire to migrate from the smallest,
least liquid, and presumably most expensive sources of credit to the larger,
deeper, and cheaper credit markets as their creditworthiness becomes
more transparent and as the cost of m onitoring the firms declines. This
assumption of migration between debt markets is consistent with life-cycle
analyses of small firms (see Walker, 1989) and firm s of all sizes (see
Churchill & Lewis, 1983). Diamond (1991) shows that as firms develop
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Table 3
Select Sources of Rinds for all Manufacturing
Industries Average from 1986 to 1993
Tbtal Debt Provided by (%)

Banks

Other
Institutions

Trade
Accounts
& Trade
Notes
Payable

<$5 million

41

26

33

100

5

80

$5-$ 10 million

48

20

31

100

2

76

$10-$25 million

50

21

30

100

3

72

$25-$50 million

50

23

27

100

3

78

$50-$ 100 milUon

47

28

25

100

3

78

$100-$250miUion

44

34

22

100

5

60

$250M-$1B

36

45

19

100

13

49

>$1B

17

64

19

100

13

49

All size classes

25

53

21

100

100

68

Size Class

Row Tbtal

Relative
Total*

Retention
Rate**

Notes:

*Relative total is total funds to a size class, excluding retained earnings, as a percent of total
funds to all firms.
♦♦Retention rate is net after-tax income not distributed as dividends as a percent of total
after-tax-income.

Source:

Quarterly Financial Reports of the Census (1986-1993).

reputation their access to the direct finance market increases. This pattern
suggests th a t th e re are p reco n d itio n s to d eb t m arket m ig ratio n .
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) formaUze the decision for the borrower
as a choice between directly signaling its quality to investors and indirectly
signaling quality by contracting debt through a financial intermediary.
Here, the borrower will choose the signalling process that involves lower
costs. Signalling costs can vary by numerous factors including borrower
size, industry, age, and collateral.
O ther types of costs may also prom pt firms to choose direct finance over
bank-intermediated debt when possible. Rajan (1992) argues that bankinterm ediated debt becomes onerous and wealth-extracting because of the
access and control over the firm that the bank’s relationship with the bor
rower provides. As a consequence, borrowers will migrate to other sources
of finance whenever possible. However, Carey et al. (1993) qualify this line
of argument by pointing out that the greater ability to renegotiate bank
debt has value that compensates for some of its higher direct and indirect
costs. For this reason, firms with access to the direct finance market might
instead choose a large, syndicated bank loan.
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SECURITIZATION

Securitization is the process of bundling existing loans into pools and issu
ing new financial claims against those pools. These new financial claims can
have denomination, maturity, and risk characteristics that are either identi
cal to or different firom those of the underlying loans, depending upon the
purposes of the securitization and the perceived preferences of investors.
During the past two decades, securitization has been successfiilly utilized in
certain sectors and has revolutionized some areas of financial intermedia
tion, beginning with mortgages in the 1970s, and spreading to other assets
such as automobile loans and credit card receivables in recent years. The
ability of securitization to transform seemingly illiquid assets into easily
marketable securities has lead to substantial benefits for the borrower,
lender, and investor.
Securitization can be viewed as a vehicle allowing once bank-dependent
borrowers to migrate to the public debt markets. Based on the above dis
cussion, and as depicted in Figure 1, select borrowers can accomplish such
migration only when important information, monitoring, and size criteria
are met. Pooling solves the size problem. Technological advances have
eased the information problems, allowing for the accumulation and analy
sis of enormous amounts of loan performance information. It is now rela
tively affordable for third-party investors to evaluate through due diligence
the expected performance of the credits that underlie a securitization.
Such efficiency gains have diminished one of the key motives for forming
“financial coalitions” in the first place: the reduction of transactions costs
to individual investors.
Achieving transactions cost reductions relies on more than just technol
ogy, however. The ability to utilize sampling techniques on the target port
folio is also a critical factor in lowering due diligence costs. In a sufficiendy
large pool of small credits, investors can randomly sample the loans, rather
than evaluate all of them, without compromising the credit analysis. Due
diligence costs would be prohibitive otherwise. This reliance on sampling
assumes some degree of homogeneity in the underlying credits, not only in
terms of the underwriting standards that they satisfy, 1but also in perfor
mance characteristics. Transactions costs for the investor are also reduced
to some extent by professional rating agencies, which provide verification
of the observed quality of the underlying credits. Rating agencies also help
size the credit enhancements or “loss protection” that the underlying cred
its will require before the associated securities will command the attention
of investors.
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All Manufacturing, by Asset Size Class

Retention Rate
Total Debt Provided by Banks
Total Debt Provided by Nonbanks
Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986-1993).

Rgurel
Quarterly Financial Data

Because of the nature of the credits that have been securitized in vol
ume to date, direct post-credit monitoring has not been a problem needing
resolution. Nearly all of the credits that have been securitized in volume
have been asset-backed, except for credit card receivables and accounts
receivable. Credit card receivables, however, generate an excess spread to
protect investors from losses. Securitized accounts receivable deals have
involved large, v\rell-known corporations, short-term maturities, and sub
stantial overcollateralization (loss protection).
It is im portant to emphasize that although securitization can provide a
vehicle to move intermediated loans into the capital markets, it cannot by
itself resolve underlying information and monitoring problems. Individual
loans that are information- and monitoring-problematic before the securi
tization will be no less so after the securitization. Securitization is an inform ation-consum ing technology, not an inform ation-generating one.
Consequently, securitization delivers the most benefits when the credits in
the pool have few information or monitoring problems or, if substantial
problems are present, when inexpensive loss protection is available.
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For loan types with few such problems, the potential benefits of securi
tization are numerous, including increased asset liquidity, improved alloca
tion of risk, a higher level of investment in the affected sector, and, for
banks, a reduction in regulatory capital and reserve requirements. Further
more, by allowing for a separation of loan origination, loan funding, and
loan servicing, securitization allows market participants to play to their
strengths. The net eflFect of these benefits is lower prices or an increase in
the general level of investment in the affected sector or both. Arguments for
how and why these potential benefits emerge are numerous and compel
ling; the principal ones are outlined in the next section. Subsequent sec
tions analyze why such benefits are unlikely w hen inform ation and
monitoring problems have not been resolved.
A. The Benefits of Securitization
Securitization could raise overall investm ent by channeling funds
between inform ationally segm ented banking m arkets. Segm entation
results because banks in one region have better information about the local
economy and potential borrowers than do banks firom other regions. Banks
in one community may not be willing, therefore, to make loans to borrowers
in another, simply because they are unable to properly evaluate the credit
worthiness of those borrowers. Profitable projects in one region may go
unfunded, while marginally profitable projects in other regions receive
funds.
The underlying premise here is that opportunity-rich banks face a fund
ing or deposit constraint but view an expansion of the deposit base as a
costly option. The crucial implication of this premise is that banks are will
ing to accept the risk of additional loans—would make and hold more loansif they had funding available. Securitization provides a means of resolving
the liquidity constraint by tying the constrained banks to capital/deposit
resources in another community. Through the vehicle of securitization,
capital-surplus or deposit-surplus banks in regions with limited lending
opportunities could purchase loans m ade by capital-constrained or
deposit-constrained banks in regions with abundant lending opportunities
(see Boyd & Smith, 1989; or Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1994). By linking pre
viously segmented markets, securitization would provide borrowers with
funding opportunities that did not previously exist.
Lower prices and/or higher quantities of credit may result for the
affected borrowers—such as buyers of homes or small business owners—as
securitization allows banks to tap a broader funding base than is available
through the more restricted demand deposit market. Securitization can
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lower funding rates in many ways. Investors outside the bank’s local
deposit market may have a greater tolerance for interest rate and credit
risk, and these investors may have maturity preferences that directly match
those of the assets being funded. Further benefits can arise from the oppor
tunities for portfolio risk management achieved by expanding the number
of loans in the pool to achieve both geographic and industry diversification.
The transform ation of denom inations and maturities made possible
through securitizations can also fiirther improve risk-sharing beyond that
achieved by tapping into a broader funding base. Securitizations typically
involve multi-tranche or multi-class securities, which allow investors to hold
claims against specific bank assets, with credit risk varying across each
tranche.'^ The most risk-averse investors would purchase the senior claims,
whereas those with less risk-aversion can select the subordinated claims.
Borrowing rates would be reduced to the extent that the multiple instru
ments more closely match investor preferences. This is consistent with Beneveniste and Berger (1987), who argue th at securitization may lower
fimding costs by creating prioritized or sequential loss claims.
Securitization might also deliver lower overall funding costs to banks by
allowing them to reduce or avoid regulatory taxes, such as reserve and cap
ital requirements, a point made by Pennachi (1988). The reduction in reg
ulatory taxes results from the decreased reliance on deposits and the
reduction in asset holdings, or in some cases a shift to asset holdings that
require less capital. Increased marketability of these loans also may lower
the liquidity premium that banks would require to hold these assets. In a
competitive market, these lower funding costs will translate into lower
interest rates for borrowers, thus prompting more bank lending.
James (1988) a r^ e s that securitization may raise overall investment by
resolving a conflict that can arise between a bank’s shareholders and debt
holders. Bank management may forego profitable investment opportuni
ties that would reduce the bank’s overall risk in order to avoid a wealth
transfer from shareholders to debtholders. This transfer takes place
because yields on debt payments are fixed and reflect the riskiness of the
portfolio that exists at the time the debt is issued. Even though subsequent
projects may lower the portfolio’s risk, debt payments remain fixed. Thus,
existing debtholders would be compensated to carry more risk than they
actually bear Shareholder resistance to this wealth transfer islikely to result
in underinvestment in risk-reducing, profitable projects. Securitized debt
resolves this conflict by effectively issuing new debt for each pool of new
projects. Returns to new debtholders therefore will always reflect the actual
risk of the new projects being undertaken. All else equal, this would raise
the level of investment in the affected loan markets.
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B. “Disintermediation Securitization” vs.
“Balance-Sheet Securitization”

The net benefits of interhnked markets—^improved risk-sharing, reduc
tion in regulatory taxes, resolution of shareholder/debtholder conflicts—^is
a lower borrowing rate or a higher quantity of credit or both. These bene
fits will not, however, automatically materialize wherever securitization is
applied. Basically, the benefits of securitization to the selling bank (and the
affected borrower) rise as the amount of loss protection provided by the
selling bank falls.^ Conversely, the benefits of the loan sale fall as the
amount of loss protection provided by the selling bank rises.^ In fact, the
capital benefits of the loan sale approach zero as the percentage loss pro
tection provided by the seller approaches the percentage capital charge on
the loan.^^
That loss protection, or credit enhancement as it is also called, can take
any number of forms: a subordinate piece on a structured deal, a letter of
credit guaranteeing first losses up to a certain percentage of principal
value, or a recourse obligation. Regardless of the form, the economic effect
of providing loss protection is that the seller retains some, or in many cases,
all of the credit risk on the underlying loans. This provision of loss protec
tion mitigates the benefits of securitization to the seller.
Consider the mechanics. If a bank can sell off all of a single mortgage
loan, then it has shed the entire risk of the loan and now can use the pro
ceeds of the sale to make additional loans. By entering into a cycle of orig
ination and sale, the bank can raise the number of mortgage loans it makes
in a given year while generating fee income, yet it neither alters its risk pro
file nor incurs capital costs because it does not book any assets. Further
more, because the loan sale process frees originators from having to hold
these assets on book, new nonbank originators have more incentive to enter
the market. The net effect is therefore twofold: each originator can make
more loans than before and the number of participating originators rises.
Following Berger and Udell (1992), we call this type of securitization
“disintermediation securitization. ” Disintermediation securitization is defined
as securitization involving the sale of bank loans where the seller retains no
stake in the loans and no longer acts as principal monitor of the loan to
ensure its repaym ent. Banks m ight continue to play a role as broker
between borrower and lender, but they are no longer the only agent that
can match borrowers and investors, and they no longer necessarily provide
the funding or the monitoring for the loans. Loan sales under these conditions
would genuinely reflect a shift away from bank-frmded debt to directfinancing by the
capital markets. Borrowers are naturally migrating fi-om a debt market that
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requires some degree of lender monitoring to another debt market, where
the lender does not need to retain a stake in the credit and where the
lender’s role in monitoring is reduced or eliminated. This natural migra
tion to the next credit market delivers lower funding costs and a higher
qucintity of credit to the affected borrowers. Developments in the mortgage
and auto loan markets exemplify this type of migration. In both of those
cases, a bank is no longer needed in the underwriting, servicing or moni
toring of the loans.
In contrast, if a bank can only sell off a senior portion of the loan,
retaining, for example, the first 20 percent as loss protection, then the bank
has less to use for additional loans and the bank retains the preponderance
of the credit risk of that loan.^^ The bank certainly has proceeds available
to make additional loans, but each new loan alters the bank’s risk profile.
Furthermore, under current and proposed capital rules for loan sales where
the seller retains some obligation to cover losses, the bank’s regulatory cap
ital charces can easily be equal to the capital it held against the loan before
the sale.^ Unless the bank finds the marginal cost of deposit generation
too great, such that securitized funding comes cheaper, securitization buys
the bank little benefit. Similarly, the incentive for non-bank originators to
enter the market is also dam pened to the extent that they cannot act as sim
ple fee generating brokers, but might actually have to maintain a lending
book.
We label these transactions “balance-sheet securitizations” defining them
as securitizations where the originator retains a stake in the loans sold. As
described, the originator can maintain this stake either on-balance sheet,
perhaps by holding a subordinated position, or off-balance sheet, through
the provision of recourse or a letter of credit. Regardless of the form of
this stake, the seller is obligated to cover losses up to a certain percentage
of the asset’s value. In this respect, the seller’s stake in the loan plays a role
much like that of regulatory capital, which is first in line to absorb losses
against a bank’s portfoUo. Balance-sheet securitizations, even poolings of
nonperforming real estate, routinely take place.
C.

Factors Influencing the Amount o f
Seller-Provided Loss Protection

Two critical factors affect the amount of loss protection a bank will have
to provide on loans it sells: 1) the risks and returns of the underlying assets;
and 2 ) the amount of direct monitoring the loans will require and the costs
involved in arranging for that monitoring. Obviously, the higher the risk on
the underlying assets, the more loss protection the purchaser will require.
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An example of the relationship between credit quality and loss protection is
apparent in the am ount of credit loss protection that rating agencies
require of loan portfolios that desire a certain rating. Table 4 shows the
amount of structural credit protection required to obtain each of the listed
ratings. The column on the right provides an example of how much loss
the underlying collateral with the corresponding rating must be able to
withstand without interrupting payments. The lower the credit quality, the
higher loss protection is provided. Note also that the lower the initial qual
ity of the underlying loans, the more marginal loss protection the deal
requires to reach the top rating.
O f course, investors need basic information about a host of borrower
and business attributes to estimate risks and returns. The absence of such
information regarding the creditworthiness of the underlying borrowers
complicates risk assessment, thereby leading investors to require even more
loss protection. Information problems also make it difficult for purchasers
to detect whether losses they experience on the loans they purchase are due
to bad luck, bad underwriting, or moral hazard. This difficulty creates an
incentive for the seller to sell bad loans or to make loans that they otherwise
would not make.^^ However, the purchaser minimizes adverse incentives to
the seller by raising the seller’s stake in the loans sold. Since the adverse
actions will now affect the seller first and foremost, the seller has incentive
to adhere to prudent underwriting practices. In short, loss protection will
rise as risk rises and as inform ation problems about risks and returns
worsen.
The relationship between monitoring problems and the amount of a
loan the bank can sell off is also straightforward. Banks that sell loans lose
their incentive to monitor (see Beider & Udell, 1992; Boyd & Smith, 1989;
Greenbaum & Thakor, 1987; Mester, 1992). Failing to m onitor can
adversely affect the distribution of loan returns, as described above. The
more severe the agency problem, the greater the adverse impact that failing
to monitor will have on the return distribution. Investors can be expected
to recognize the relationship between monitoring and returns for such loan
types, and to seek a contract that restores the bank’s incentive to monitor.
By purchasing less of the loan, the buyer leaves the bulk of the benefits from
monitoring to the selling agent, restoring the seller’s incentive to properly
monitor the borrowers.
Preliminary research by Beshouri and Nigro (1994) on loan sales con
tracts provides some evidence for the relationship between monitoring and
loss protection. Beshouri and Nigro analyze large credits sold off by U.S.
commercial banks in an effort to isolate the factors affecting the level of loss
protection provided by a selling bank. Among other things, their analysis
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m i e 4:
Loss Protection Associated with a
Given Credit Rating on Senior Bank Loans
Desired Rating

Source:

Loss Protection Provided
(percent)

Aaa

51

Aal

41

Aa2

39

Aa3

37

A1

35

A2

34

A3

32

Baal

31

Baa2

29

Baa3

26

Linda Moses (1992).

shows that the lead or originating bank on these large credits retains a
greater share of the loans that require more extensive post-funding moni
toring. Specifically, for those loans where monitoring requirements are
high, the average amount the selling bank must retain on those loans is
higher than the average amount required for all loans.
Overall, loss protection will rise as risk worsens, and as problems of
information and monitoring worsen. However, the higher the level of loss
protection provided by the selling bank, the higher its credit risk exposure,
the less it has in the way of funds to recycle, and the fewer regulatory capital
benefits the loan sale can generate. Capital costs are perhaps the most sig
nificant issue for most banks contemplating loan sales. However, once the
percentage loss protection provided by the bank exceeds the percentage
capital requirement for the loans securitized, the bank no longer generates
capital cost savings. Regulatory policy currently requires banks to hold cap
ital against all of the assets supported by a recourse obligation.
V

SMALL BUSINESS LOAN SEDURITIZATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS AND SOME EVIDENCE

Based upon the foregoing a ilm e n ts , securitizations of loans that are infor
mation- and monitoring-problematic should carry substantial amounts of
loss protection. This should be the case for securitizations of small business
loans, because little public information exists about small business borrow-
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ers and they require substantial amounts of post-funding monitoring. The
structure of the few small business loan securitizations that have been done
to date is consistent with these predictions.
Table 5 shows im portant characteristics of three securitizations of non
guaranteed, small business loan securitizations.^® Most importantly, all
three deals required substantial loss protection. The Chrysler Financial
Corporation securitization carried a 35 percent subordination, while the
Fremont General Corporation deal of 1993, the first transaction under SEC
Rule 3(a)-7, carried 19 percent subordination.^^ The Money Store deal,
which securitized the unguaranteed portions of SBA loans, carried nine
percent subordination, and a four percent spread account.
The level of
loss protection is well in excess of the capital charge for all these transac
tions.
Several other features of these securitizations are also worth noting.
1. All the loans in each individual deal are from the same originator
or group of affiliated originators, so there is naturally some “unifor
mity” in the loan underwriting standards. This would not automat
ically be the case for pools of loans originated by a multitude of
unaffiliated lenders.
2. These transactions are all asset-backed; real estate was used in two
cases.
3. The average loan size in each case is fairly laige, making the under
lying credits more middle-market than small business loans. The
average loan size varies from about $200,000 in the Chrysler deal
to over $1.5 million in the Fremont deal.
More recently, Norwest, a bank holding company headquartered in
Minneapolis, has been making an effort to securitize small business loans.
Norwest has approached smaller banks in the region with strong credit
track records to participate in a securitization program. These smaller orig
inating banks screen potential borrowers using a weighted average of four
separate credit worthiness tests: cash flow, leverage, profitability, and work
ing capital. To ensure homogeneity of loans, Norwest only considers loans
to manufacturers for the program. Loans that pass the four-part screen are
referred by the originating bank to Norwest, where they have a 75 percent
chance of being pooled and securitized. Both of these requirements—lim
iting the credits to a fairly homogenous pool and satisfying strict underwrit
ing perform ance criteria—greatly reduce any inform ation problem s
associated with these loans. Most importantly, and consistent with our pre
dictions, Norwest requires each participating banks to maintain a 65 per-
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cent ownership position in the loans it sells. This mitigates any remaining
information and risk problems, and eases any concerns the pooler and the
ultimate investors may have about the loans being properly monitored.
Thus far, Norwest has not yet been able to gather sufficient credits to get
the program off the ground.
In contrast to the thin secondary market for unguaranteed small busi
ness loans, there exists a flourishing secondary market for the guaranteed
portions of SBA 7(a) loans. About 37,000 SBA loans, with value of about
$7.9 billion, have traded hands since the secondary market began operat
ing. This market provides liquidity to the guaranteed portions of SBA
loans, and helps originators better match maturities of assets and liabilities.
This market also enhances SBA’s ability to provide small businesses with
access to long-term debt.
SBA-backed small business loans are, however, quite different from the
types of small business credits analyzed in this study. The SBA loans in
these pools are, by definition, registered instruments backed by the full faith
and credit of the U.S. government. Furthermore, the pools only include the
guaranteed portions of those SBA loans. This guarantee effectively
amounts to 100 percent loss protection, thus obviating any investor con
cerns over risk, information, or monitoring. Clearly, the success of the sec
ondary market for the guaranteed portions of SBA loans flows from the
presence of the U.S. government guarantee, a guarantee not present for
ordinary loans.
The actual and proposed securitization programs of non-guaranteed
small business loans described above are all examples of what we call “bal
ance sheet securitizations,” meaning that the selling banks are not able to
entirely shed the loan (and the risk) from their balance sheets. The crucial
distinction between small business loan securitizations that have taken
place and disintermediation securitization is that with respect to the former,
concerns about potential adverse actions on the part of the selling bank, the
riskiness of the underlying borrowers, and the impact of monitoring on a
loan’s returns have not been resolved. Rather, these concerns have been cir
cumvented through the provision of ample loss protection by the selling
agent.
Over time, subordination specifically, and loss protection generally, may
decline as the market becomes increasingly familiar with these transactions.
However, this loss protection must not only fall as low as the capital require
ment that banks normally must meet on such loans, it must surpass that
point to generate capital cost savings for banks. Furthermore, if nonbank
originators in the mortgage credit market are any guide, nonbank origina
tors are likely to enter the small business lending market in large numbers
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Table 5. Small Business Loan Securitizations
Issuer

Fremont Financial

Chrysler Financial

The Money Store

Credit
Type

Nationwide
real-estate secured

Nationwide revolving
asset-backed loans

Nationwide adjustable
SBA 7(a) loans secured by
owner occupied commer
cial real estate

Amount

$350 million

$200 million

$76 million

Structure

REMIC Trust

Revolving Master
Trust

Revolving Master Trust

Rating

AAA

AAA

Class A: AAA
Class B : A

Loss
Protectio n

35 percent
subordination

19 percent
subordination

9 percent subordination
4 percent spread account

Pricing

LIBOR + 120bp

LIBOR + 47bp

Class A: Prime -95.0 bp
Class B: Prime -12.5 bp

Expected
Term

2 years

3 years

7.6 years

Investor
Profile

Bank portfolios,
Europe and mutual
funds

Mutual funds and
bank portfolio

Mutual funds and other
institutional investors

Loan size

No mortgage loan
having a principal
greater than
$2,000,000
Average: $209,730

Loan from $500,000
to $5,000,000
Average: $1,500,000

Original loan less than
$50,000 to $2,000,000
Average: $398,000

when their need to maintain a portfolio of these credits is minimal. Retain
ing portions of the loans they originate pushes these market participants
into the role of portfolio manager.
Securitization of small business loans therefore can take place, and
we have seen a scattered few, but such securitizations do not allow small
business loans to migrate fully off the bank’s balance sheet. Because of
these factors, securitization will not allow banks to shed risk, generate
fees, or lower capital costs to the extent seen in the securitizations of
other types of loans. Consequently, in the absence of government guar
antees (im plicit or explicit), or other program s that reduce the risks
faced by loan purchasers or loan sellers, securitization cannot be
expected to have the same impact on credit flows to small business bor
rowers that it has had for borrowers in the m ortgage, auto loan, or
credit card markets.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The securitization of business loans is not a sufficient condition to increase
the amount of credit available to small businesses. This does not mean that
securitization lacks value in the area of small business lending, only that the
value lies elsewhere. Securitization might furnish investors with a bankdirected channel for funding small business loans, facilitate some diversifi
cation, and increase the liquidity of select portions of a bank’s small business
loan portfolio. However, our analysis suggests that the level of loss protec
tion increases as information problems and the need for direct monitoring
required by the lender rise and that as the amount of loss protection rises,
the benefits fipom securitization are greatly reduced. Two of the most prom
inent characteristics of small business borrowers are the lack of information
available about small business risks and returns, and the substantial amount
of post-funding monitoring they require. Consequently, any such securiti
zations are likely to carry substantial loss protection, which, among its other
effects, will reduce or eliminate any capital cost reductions expected from
thesecuritization. Consequently, such securitizations are likely to have little
impact on a bank’s willingness to make more of the same loans. Regardless
of the future success of schemes to securitize the high end of small business
loan market, banks are likely to retain an important role in small business
finance due to their special advantages in monitoring these credits.
If securitization is unlikely to raise the equilibrium level of small busi
ness lending, the obvious question is: what will? Members of Congress have
proposed a num ber of bills they believe will accomplish this goal. Some of
their bills envision an explicit guarantee through an expansion of SBA
lending or creation of a government-sponsored enterprise (e.g., \felda-Sue).
Others would create an implicit guarantee through the deposit insurance
fund by lowering the capital requirements against recourse obligations.
Some of these programs seek to promote a secondary market for small busi
ness loans, while others go directly to the issues of the risk and losses asso
ciated with small-business lending, treating the development of a secondary
market as a separate issue. Further analysis would be necessary to deter
mine the merits of these various approaches.
If a securitization program were preceded by or developed simulta
neously with some type of loan guarantee or credit enhancement program,
then the amount of credit available to smaller firms would easily increase.
However, the increase in small business lending would follow largely from
the guarantee, not the presence of a secondary market. While the implicit
or explicit guarantees in government-sponsored programs might improve
the flow of credit to small businesses, the benefits must be weighed along
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with the costs. In particular, federal or state guarantees or credit enhance
ment programs to promote a secondary market would expose government
to significant contingent liabilities and could subject commercial banks to
subsidized competition.
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NOTES
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

Numerous proxies have been used to define a business as small, including the number
of employees, the level of annual sales or assets, the oi^anizational structure, and the
level of market concentration in an industry. For the purposes of this paper, we are
concerned with firms that are involuntarily confined to a local financial market in
accessing credit and face all of the problems that such segmentation implies. In
particular, market segmentation can lead to differences in rates across borrowers with
similar risk characteristics, but residing in different locales. By moving away fix>m a
definition that focuses strictly on specific size characteristics and moving toward one
that groups firms according to common elements in their financing outcomes, we avoid
excluding firms that might face financing constraints but which would not be
considered small on an asset-based or employee-based standard.
See Davies (1993).
See Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) for a description of the data.
The price mechanism does not provide a perfect screening device, because raising
interest rates to compensate for concerns over risk may actually drive out safe
borrowers, and lower the average credit quality of the borrower pool. For a discussion
of credit rationing, see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
If banks are allowed to branch across state lines, larger firms would have a genuine
option to use a single banking firm for all of their transactions services. Nakamura’s
argument would then have some, but not complete, applicabihty for these latter firms
as well. The difference is that larger firms may be more transparent to third parties
even if a single bank handles all of that firm’s banking business.
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The critical difference from Carey et al. (1993) is that information availability is broken
down here to its component parts: information for origination and information for
monitoring. We also subsume the firm size into the information spectrum.
Whereas loan sales typically distribute losses proportional to the participation of the
loan purchaser, securitization allows a bank to prioritize or sequence claims against a
pool of loans, such that one party provides loss protection to all subsequent investors
in the loan pool. Each sequence represents a separate tranche, or loss position, just as
senior debt is one tranche and mezzanine debt another.
It is immaterial whether this loss protection is purchased or provided in the way of a
retained portion of the loan.
Portions retained in securitizations typically differ from portions retained in
participations. In the latter case, all participants share losses and proceeds
proportional to their percentage participation. So a 10 percent participation in a loan
exposes the participant to 10 percent of the losses and obligates the participating bank
to put up 10 percent of the overall capital required. In the event of a 10 percent loss
on the underlying assets, the holder of a 10 percent participation would absorb a one
percent loss. Securitizations are more akin to structured financings, where loss
positions are sequential not proportional, and where capital requirements can be more
substantial. For example, a 10 percent subordinate position in a securitization would
expose the participant to all losses against the total assets securitized up to the flill
value of that position. So a 10 percent loss on the underlying assets would wipe out this
subordinated position and leave all holders of senior positions intact.
Capital benefits are zero when the seller provides first-loss protection equal to or
greater than the capital charge on the loans sold. For example, capital benefits are zero
if a banks holds a four percent first-loss position on mortgage loans sold into a pool.
This is because current capital rules require that the selling bank hold capital not only
against the first-loss position, but against all more senior positions as well. These rules
reflect the fact that a subordinate position in a securitization exposes the holder to all
losses against the total assets securitized, up to the full value of that subordinate piece.
Because the bank holds the first 20 percent of the loan, it faces all losses on the
underlying loan up to 20 percent which, except for exceedingly risky loans, covers the
preponderance of the credit risk.
For a description of current and proposed recourse capital rules, see Federal Register
1994. The Riegle Banking Act of 1994 has special provisions that could ease capital
requirements for well-capitalized banks.
Loss protection can also be capitalized into purchase price through the use of
discounts. The disadvantage of this loss protection for sellers is that they must
recognize expected future losses (or some multiple of expected future losses) upon sale,
and would not benefit if losses turned out to be less than expected.
The importance of strict FNMA and GNMA guidelines becomes more apparent in
light of the incentives that sellers of loans can face. Strict guidelines by these agencies
help police seller behavior, and violation of these guidelines can lead to loss of
accreditation as a FNMA or GNMA participant. A similar argument is made in
Constand et al (1991) for resolving agency problems in asset-based lending contracts.
Beshouri and Nigro (1994) mimeo.
In these deals the loans were converted in to securitites by creating a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) in the form of a trust, to which the whole loans were sold. The trust then
issued securities financed from the cash flow generated by tyhe pool of loans. By
establishing a trust structure, multiple securitizations can be done, while maintaining
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maximum flexibility in the structure and terems of the series issued. An often-cited
reason for the feasibility and successful placement of these securities backed by loans
has been the SEC passage of Rule 3a-7. This rule exempted securitizations of loans
from the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The Fremont deal is also unique because the loans securitized constituted a large
percentage of the lender’s portfolio. This eliminates investors’ potential concerns that
the pool may not be representative of the lender’s entire small business loan portfolio.
Such concerns are prominent when only select portions of a portfolio are securitized.
This deal was highly unusual, and it is unlikely that the SBA would permit a less wellknown originator to complete a similar deal.
Note that even in these deals, however, the SBA requires the originator to retain the
unguaranteed portion of the loans it sells. This ensures that the originator continues
to have an incentive to monitor the loans properly. While monitoring may not matter
to the investor, it does matter to the SBA, because it is the guarantor of last resort.
One provision within the recent Community Development Financial Institution
legislation sets up a loss sharing program along the lines of state-based programs, such
as the Michigan Strategic Fund.
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